Chapter, 2024

Cultural Models Are Intrinsically Normative

Cognition In and Out of the Mind 978-3-031-48180-2, 978-3-031-48181-9, Pages 103-121

Editors: Victor C. de Munck; Giovanni Bennardo; Stephen Chrisomalis

Series: Culture, Mind, and Society ISSN 2637-6806, 2634-517X, 2637-6806, 2634-517X, Pages 103-121

Publisher: Springer Nature

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-48181-9_5

Contributors

Berniūnas, Renatas (Corresponding author) [1]

Affiliations

  1. [1] Aarhus University
  2. [NORA names: AU Aarhus University; University; Denmark; Europe, EU; Nordic; OECD]

Abstract

In this chapter, I argue that “cultural models”, understood as socially shared and action-guiding knowledge, are intrinsically normative. Arguably, the traditional approach to “cultural models” provided initial conceptual and methodological tools to systematize the whole notion of “socially shared information”, and there are occasional references to underlying normativity. But there is no systematic exposition of underlying cognitive and social components and a comprehensive discussion of normativity. Thus, in this chapter, I provide a tentative account of “cultural models” as it pertains to normative cognition, its genesis and its evolution. The goal is to connect the construct of “cultural models” to more recent theorizing in cognitive and evolutionary sciences.

Keywords

approach, cognition, components, comprehensive discussion, culture model, discussions of normativity, evolution, evolutionary science, exposition, genesis, goal, knowledge, methodological tools, model, normative cognition, normativity, reference, science, social components, systematic exposition, theorizing, tools, traditional approaches

Data Provider: Digital Science