Corporate Governance with Chinese Characteristics: Party Organization in State-owned Enterprises

Abstract This article analyses the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the corporate governance of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including a case study of a central-level SOE holding group. Relying on official documents, secondary literature and interviews with enterprise managers, government officials and academics, the article documents how the CCP has actively formalized its role in Chinese business by embedding itself in the corporate governance structure of SOEs. Through the application of Chinese indigenous administrative corporate governance concepts such as “bidirectional entry, cross appointment” and “three majors, one big,” the CCP has consolidated its dominance of enterprise decision-making procedures and personnel appointment and created a hybrid, Party-led model of corporate governance. While this hybrid model can secure enterprise compliance, communication with higher state and Party organs, as well as long-term development planning, it is unlikely to help solve SOE efficiency problems and may even undermine other SOE reforms. 摘要 本文以的非上市中央国有控股公司为例,分析了中国共产党在国有企业公司治理中的作用.本文通过搜集官方文件、次要数据以及与企业经理、政府官员和学者的访谈,分析了中共如何将其纳入国有企业的公司治理结构中,从而积极地使其在国有企业中的作用正式化。通过运用中国本土行政公司治理概念,例如“双向进入,交叉任命”和“三重一大”,中共巩固了在企业决策程序和人事任命方面的主导地位,建立了由党领导的混合公司治理模式。虽然这种混合模式可以确保企业合规性,与上级国家和党机关的沟通以及长期发展规划,但它无法协助解决国有企业的效率问题,并且可能破坏其他国有企业的改革。